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A FLOOR, NOT A CEILING: FEDERALISM AND 
REMEDIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN DANFORTH V. 
MINNESOTA 
By Ilya Somin* 
Few doubt that states can provide greater protection for individual 
rights under state constitutions than is available under the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Federal Constitution.  More difficult issues arise, how-
ever, when state courts seek to provide greater protection than the Court re-
quires for federal constitutional rights.  Can state courts impose remedies 
for violations of federal constitutional rights that are more generous than 
those required by the Federal Supreme Court?  That is the issue raised by 
the Court’s recent decision in Danforth v. Minnesota.1  In a 7-2 decision 
joined by an unusual coalition of liberal and conservative justices, the Court 
decided that state courts could indeed provide victims of constitutional 
rights violations broader remedies than those mandated by federal Supreme 
Court decisions.  I contend that this outcome is correct, despite the seeming 
incongruity of allowing state courts to deviate from the Supreme Court’s in-
terpretation of the Federal Constitution.  The Supreme Court should estab-
lish a floor for remedies below which states cannot fall.  But there is no 
reason for it to also mandate a ceiling. 
Part I briefly describes the facts and background to Danforth.  In Part 
II, I provide a doctrinal justification for the Supreme Court’s decision.  It 
makes sense to allow state courts to provide more generous remedies than 
those mandated by the federal courts in cases where restrictions on the 
scope of remedies are not imposed by the Constitution itself, but are instead 
based on policy grounds.  State courts can legitimately conclude that these 
policy grounds are absent or outweighed by other considerations within 
their state systems, even if they are compelling justifications for restricting 
the scope of remedies available in federal courts.  State courts are in a better 
position to weigh the relevant tradeoffs in a state legal system than federal 
courts are. 
Part III explains the potential policy advantages of allowing interstate 
diversity in remedies, most importantly inter-jurisdictional competition and 
an increased ability to provide for diverse citizen preferences and local con-
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ditions across different parts of the country.  The optimal remedy for a con-
stitutional rights violation in New York may well be different from the op-
timal remedy for one that occurs in Mississippi. 
I. DANFORTH AND ITS ORIGINS 
In its 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court 
held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment requires that 
defendants have the right to “confront” witnesses against them in person at 
a trial.2  Three years later, the Court held that states are not required to ap-
ply this rule retroactively to pre-Crawford convictions.3  The combination 
of these two rulings set the stage for Danforth. 
In 1996, eight years before Crawford, a Minnesota Court convicted 
Stephen Danforth of criminal sexual assault against a minor.  The six-year-
old victim did not testify at the trial, but the jury “saw and heard a video-
taped interview of the child.”4  Danforth challenged his conviction on the 
grounds that the use of the videotape at his trial violated the Confrontation 
Clause, as interpreted in Crawford.  The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected 
his argument, holding that Minnesota courts were forbidden by federal Su-
preme Court precedent to “give a Supreme Court decision of federal consti-
tutional criminal procedure broader retroactive application that that given 
by the Supreme Court.”5  Previous Supreme Court decisions had held that 
newly announced rules of constitutional criminal procedure do not apply 
retroactively unless they fall into two narrowly defined categories: rules that 
forbid state authorities to criminalize the conduct in question and “water-
shed” rules that “implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial.”6  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that Danforth’s case fell outside the scope 
of both of these categories and concluded that state courts were therefore 
barred from giving him retroactive relief for this violation of the Sixth 
Amendment.7  
In a 7-2 decision, the United States Supreme Court overruled the Min-
nesota Supreme Court’s ruling that state courts are forbidden to grant retro-
active relief for violations of constitutional rights in cases where the Federal 
Supreme Court does not require them to do so.8  Ironically, the Court’s rul-
ing gives state courts greater latitude then they would have been allowed 
 
2
  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004) (link). 
3
  Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007) (link). 
4
  Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1033. 
5
  Danforth v. State, 718 N.W.2d 451, 456 (Minn. 2006), rev’d, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008). 
6
  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310–12 (1989) (plurality opinion) (link).  Although the so-called 
“Teague rule” was first outlined in a plurality opinion joined by only four justices, it was accepted by 
the majority of the Court in a later decision that followed soon afterwards.  See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 
U.S. 302, 313–19 (1989) (endorsing and applying the Teague rule). 
7
  Danforth, 718 N.W.2d at 460–61. 
8
  Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1038–47. 
102:365  (2008) A Floor, Not a Ceiling 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/18/ 367 
under the Minnesota Supreme Court’s approach.9  The majority, held that 
the case turned on a question of state law remedies, not federal constitu-
tional law.10 Both the four most liberal justices, and the three most conser-
vative—Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—voted in favor of this result. 
In a forceful dissent, joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy, Chief Justice 
John Roberts argued that remedies for violations of federal constitutional 
rights are indeed a matter of federal law, and that the Constitution requires 
nationwide “uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States” 
on all federal constitutional issues.11  
At least at first glance, it seems as if Roberts has a point.  After all, 
remedies for violations of constitutional rights are elements of the rights 
themselves.  For example, the Fifth Amendment right to “just compensa-
tion” for a taking of private property necessarily includes the right to sue 
the government for compensation if it takes a citizen’s property without 
paying for it.12  There is, therefore, some intuitive appeal to the claim that 
they must be uniform “throughout the whole United States.”  As Roberts 
put it, the majority’s approach allows “the Federal Constitution . . . to be 
applied differently in every one of the several States,” thus creating the kind 
of “disuniformity” that the Constitution was in part established to prevent.13  
However, there are good reasons to permit such “disuniformity” that are 
largely ignored by both the dissenters and the majority. 
Roberts’s logic is correct insofar as it requires states to provide a 
minimal level of remedies for violations of federal constitutional rights—a 
floor.  But his logic does not apply with equal force to allowing the Su-
preme Court to impose a ceiling. 
II. FEDERALISM AND POLICY-BASED LIMITS ON REMEDIES FOR 
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
Neither the majority nor the dissent in Danforth ever seriously consid-
ered the fact that limits on the retroactivity of remedies for rights violations 
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do not rest on constitutional mandates but on policy concerns.14  When the 
courts refuse to remedy an admitted constitutional rights violation because 
of policy considerations that weigh against retroactivity, they are, in effect, 
subordinating a constitutional concern to a policy preference.  
Yet this is precisely what happened in Whorton v. Brockling, the 2007 
Supreme Court case that held that states are not required to apply the Craw-
ford Confrontation Clause decision retroactively.15  In Whorton, the Court 
noted that the procedure followed by the state court in convicting the defen-
dant had violated his Confrontation Clause rights by interpreting the Clause 
in a way inconsistent with the intent of “the Framers” of the Bill of Rights.16  
However, the Court refused to apply this ruling to pre-Crawford cases be-
cause the old rule—although based on a flawed interpretation of the Sixth 
Amendment—did not significantly increase the chances of an inaccurate 
conviction and therefore did not outweigh the policy considerations weigh-
ing against retroactive application of new Supreme Court decisions under 
Teague.17  Justice O’Connor, the author of Teague, has characterized its 
presumption against retroactivity as an example of how “federal courts ex-
ercising their habeas powers may refuse to grant relief on certain claims be-
cause of ‘prudential concerns’ such as equity and federalism.”18  Other 
relevant “prudential concerns” weighing against retroactivity include the 
need to ensure finality in criminal proceedings19 and the danger of recidi-
vism by offenders released prematurely if their convictions are invalidated. 
One might legitimately question whether it is ever permissible for the 
Court to allow “prudential concerns” to trump constitutional rights.  After 
all, a crucial purpose of enshrining any interest as a constitutional right is 
precisely to ensure that it overrides ordinary policy considerations, “pruden-
tial” or otherwise.  The tradeoff between a constitutional right and other ob-
jectives that might conflict with it is not for the courts to decide.  That 
decision has already been made by the framers and ratifiers of the Constitu-
tion.  There are good reasons to believe that the policy judgments of the su-
permajorities that produce constitutional amendments are likely to be better 
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Danforth by a legal scholar that I know of—also fails to consider the importance of this distinction to 
the outcome of Danforth.  See Michael Dorf, Did Justice Stevens Pull a Fast One?  The Hidden Logic of 
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than those of the Supreme Court.20  Significantly, the framers and ratifiers 
did not include a non-retroactivity exception in the Bill of Rights.  Perhaps 
the Court should respect that “prudential” decision rather than subordinat-
ing the enforcement of constitutional rights to its own interpretation of pru-
dence.  
Nonetheless, I do not pursue this more radical criticism of non-
retroactivity here.  Justifiably or not, the Court often weakens remedies for 
constitutional rights when it perceives weighty prudential considerations on 
the other side.  This is particularly true when a new precedent overrides a 
long-established decision that government officials have relied on in good 
faith.  Most famously, the Court adopted this approach when it ruled in 
Brown v. Board of Education II that southern states need only desegregate 
their education systems with “all deliberate speed,” rather than immedi-
ately21—despite the fact that continued segregation in what turned out to be 
a lengthy interim period would lead to an ongoing violation of constitu-
tional rights. 
At the same time, the Supreme Court should not have the same kind of 
power to impose its “prudential” policy preferences on the states as it does 
when it enforces actual constitutional rights.  Federal courts may indeed be 
in the best position to weigh conflicting policy priorities in federal legal 
proceedings (assuming that such weighing a legitimate judicial function at 
all).  State courts, however, are better placed to weigh these issues in the 
context of state proceedings, as in Danforth. 
Minnesota courts presumably have greater knowledge about the impact 
of retroactivity on their own future proceedings than the justices of the Fed-
eral Supreme Court.  They also have greater incentives to use their knowl-
edge effectively.  Should they make a ruling that imposes undue costs on 
the Minnesota legal system, Minnesota political authorities could curb the 
state courts’ powers by choosing new judges with different views or by 
passing jurisdiction-limiting legislation.  In the twenty-two states with 
elected judiciaries, including Minnesota, judges are subject to electoral 
checks.22  In other states, judges are appointed by the governor or the legis-
lature, sometimes with participation by “merit commissions.”23  Both meth-
ods give judges at least some incentive to consider policy considerations 
important to their states’ judicial systems.  By contrast, Minnesota officials 
and voters have much less influence over the selection of federal judges. 
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Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 357, (2d Series) 2007), available at 
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Undoubtedly, both electoral and non-electoral constraints on state 
judges have significant flaws. For example, widespread political ignorance 
may greatly reduce the ability of voters to monitor state judges’ perform-
ance and deny reelection to those who have reached poor decisions.24  Even 
so, state judges are clearly more accountable to their states’ voters and gov-
ernment officials than federal judges, and therefore have stronger incentives 
to give due consideration to state-level policy concerns. 
The superior knowledge and incentives of state judges relative to fed-
eral judges may have little significance in cases where state discretion is 
limited in order to enforce federal constitutional rights.  There, the Constitu-
tion does indeed seek to impose “uniformity” of the kind emphasized by 
Chief Justice Roberts in his dissent.  However, the superior position of state 
judges is very relevant to situations where the supposed justification for 
federal imposition is simply a matter of “prudential” policy considerations.  
Here, superior knowledge and incentives counsel in favor of letting state 
courts set their own rules. 
This is especially true with respect to policy arguments against retroac-
tivity that do not apply to state courts invalidating their own state’s convic-
tions.  For example, Justice O’Connor listed “federalism and comity” 
among the “prudential concerns” justifying the Teague rule.25  Obviously, 
these considerations simply do not apply to a state court reviewing the va-
lidity of state convictions within its own jurisdiction.  By definition, there is 
no issue of comity in cases like Danforth since comity problems only arise 
in a situation where one sovereign refuses to respect the decision of another.  
Nor can there be any “federalism” problem when one state court overrules 
the decision of another court from its own state. 
The Danforth majority did recognize that “federalism and comity con-
siderations” do not apply to state courts reviewing their own state’s convic-
tions, and also noted that “finality of state convictions is a state interest, not 
a federal one.”26  It even emphasized that there is a “fundamental interest in 
federalism that allows individual States to define crimes, punishments, rules 
of evidence, and rules of criminal and civil procedure in a variety of differ-
ent ways—so long as they do not violate the Federal Constitution . . . .”27  
This bedrock principle of federalism, the Court concluded, cannot be  con-
strained by “any general, undefined federal interest in uniformity.”28  How-
ever, it failed to draw the more general conclusion that state courts, not 
federal courts, are in the better position to decide policy issues arising from 
state judicial rules.  Thus, there is a fundamental difference between Su-
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(1998) (discussing the impact of political ignorance). 
25
  Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 699 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (link). 
26
  Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2008) (emphasis in original). 
27
  Id. 
28
  Id. 
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preme Court decisions that enforce federal constitutional rights and those 
that limit such enforcement on the basis of “prudential” policy considera-
tions. 
III. INTERSTATE VARIATION IN REMEDIES AND THE BENEFITS OF 
FEDERALISM 
Although I have argued that state courts are generally better placed to 
evaluate policy concerns about state court remedies than federal courts, it is 
theoretically possible that Chief Justice Roberts is right to argue that feder-
ally imposed “uniformity” in remedies is desirable.29  Perhaps this is an ex-
ception to the general rule that state courts are better judges of state legal 
rules than federal courts.  However, there is good reason to believe that al-
lowing interstate variations in remedies captures some of the standard bene-
fits of federalism.  It allows us to reap more of the benefits of interstate 
diversity, mobility, and competition. 
A. Diversity 
The ability to satisfy the diverse preferences of populations in different 
parts of the country is a classic rationale for federalism.  Both objective lo-
cal conditions and citizen preferences may differ from one state to another.  
It makes sense to allow states to adopt divergent policies in order to take 
account of such differences.30 
This point applies to diversity in remedies as much as to other types of 
policy diversity among states.  There are many reasons why the optimal 
remedy for a constitutional rights violation in one state might be different 
from the optimal remedy in another.  For example, rights violations might 
be a more common problem in some states than others, which might justify 
stronger remedies in order to increase deterrence in the state where gov-
ernment officials are more prone to violate the right in question.  Similarly, 
public opinion in State A might value a particular right more than that in 
State B.  A divergence in remedies (with a more generous remedy in State 
A) could help satisfy the preferences of voters in both states.  A uniform 
federal rule, by contrast, would leave at least one state’s voters relatively 
dissatisfied.  
There is also a strong case for interstate variation with respect to the 
specific question of retroactivity at issue in Danforth.  If a state has a long, 
egregious history of violating a particular constitutional right, retroactive 
application of remedies might be needed in order to root out the systemic 
consequences of past rights violations.  By contrast, this need is likely to be 
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Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial Restriction of Federal 
Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461, 464–68 (2002). 
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less pressing in a case where the state has rarely violated the right in ques-
tion.  To take one of the most notorious examples in American history, 
many states—particularly in the South—systematically violated the rights 
of African-American criminal defendants for decades.31  In states with this 
kind of record, retroactive remedies might be more defensible than in states 
with less history of abuse.  Additionally, the costs, as well as the benefits, 
of retroactivity are also likely to vary between states.  In some states, for 
example, there may be less danger of recidivism and less need to insist on 
finality of convictions than in others. 
These benefits of diversity do not undercut the case for establishing a 
federally mandated “floor” for constitutional remedies.  In the absence of 
such a floor, states could deny remedies for rights violations entirely, 
thereby negating the main purpose of creating enforceable constitutional 
rights in the first place.  However, there is no comparable justification for a 
federally imposed ceiling.  If state courts, for their own reasons, decide that 
they want to provide broader remedies for constitutional rights violations 
than the Supreme Court requires, they may well have good diversity-based 
reasons for doing so. 
B. Interstate Mobility and Competition 
A second crucial rationale for decentralized federalism is the ability of 
citizens to “vote with their feet” for the state government whose policies 
they prefer.32  People dissatisfied with the policies of their state can vote 
with their feet against them by migrating to a different jurisdiction whose 
policies they find more congenial. If states are free to adopt diverging poli-
cies, there will be more options for potential foot voters.  Moreover, compe-
tition for taxpaying residents and firms gives states incentives to adopt 
policies that will attract migrants and convince current residents to stay.33  
However, foot-voting and competition may not apply as readily to in-
terstate differences in remedies as to other policies.  Given the costs of 
moving, few people or firms are likely to migrate merely because one state 
has better remedies than another for violations of constitutional rights.  
This, in turn, reduces the likelihood that states will try to compete with each 
other on this dimension.  Nonetheless, there might be exceptions to this 
generalization.  Residents who are particularly concerned about the danger 
of a given rights violation may take remedies into account in their moving 
decisions.  In the Jim Crow era, when federal courts were extremely lax in 
enforcing constitutional protections for African-American criminal defen-
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  See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 76–135 (1997) (detailing this his-
tory). 
32
  See Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective 
on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 134450 (2004) (discussing 
“foot voting” and contrasting it with conventional ballot box voting). 
33
  For the benefits of interstate competition, see Somin, supra note 30 at 468–71; see also THOMAS 
R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS 1–33 (1990). 
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dants, black migrants did indeed take into account the fact that northern 
criminal justice systems treated them more favorably than southern ones.34  
On the other hand, excessive remedies that overdeter law enforcement 
might be curtailed by migration on the part of residents seeking to move to 
areas with lower crime rates. 
On balance, foot-voting and interstate competition are less compelling 
rationales for allowing variations in remedies than diversity.  But they have 
some force, nonetheless. 
CONCLUSION 
There is good reason for the Supreme Court to establish a floor for 
remedies for federal constitutional rights violations.  On the other hand, 
there is no comparable justification for it to also establish a ceiling that state 
courts are not allowed to exceed.  To the extent that the Supreme Court’s 
Danforth decision tracks this distinction, it should be welcomed. 
At this time, the extent that the Court’s ruling applies outside the Sixth 
Amendment context remains unclear.  Presumably, the Court’s reasoning 
applies to all cases where state courts provide more generous remedies for 
violations of federal constitutional rights than the Supreme Court mandates.  
However, the Danforth decision fails to provide a comprehensive explana-
tion of the right-remedy distinction and also fails to explicitly consider the 
question of how broadly its ruling will apply.  But the Court did hold that 
“the remedy a state court chooses to provide its citizens for violations of the 
Federal Constitution is primarily a question of state law” and is therefore 
not subject to a federal court-imposed ceiling.35  This suggests that its logic 
applies to all such remedies, not just those involving criminal proceedings.  
Certainly, the justification offered here for the floor-ceiling distinction in 
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